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“The trouble with Ukrainian politicians is that they 
always start towards their goals at the ninth step 
rather than the first one.” Roman Shpek, now vice-
president of Alfa Bank Ukraine, says this every 
time we meet. Not long ago, he spent eight years as 
Ukraine’s representative to the EU. “Is it that they 
just don’t understand that they’ve mixed up their 
steps? Or is it that they don’t even know what path 
they’re on?”
The guilty parties themselves, those running the 
country, make it difficult not to agree with him. 
They seem almost on purpose to turn around and 
offer the latest example of this principle in action, 
proving Mr. Shpek right.
Ukraine’s politicians claim that they want this to 
become a flourishing nation—without having first 
achieved the flowering of each individual sector 
of the country’s economy. They want the nation to 
be united—without having come up with a single 
national vision. The same holds true for European 
integration: Kyiv wants to join the EU, yet frequent-
ly fails to notice that when its readiness is broken 
down into separate points, this desire amounts to 
nothing.
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Still, it looks like Kyiv has learned a few lessons by 
now and, instead of waiting for the final step, has 
decided to start from the first one in certain areas. 
Ukraine will shortly be signing an agreement to 
join the South East European Energy Community 
Treaty (SEE-EnCT), an organization that—provided 
Ukraine upholds all the rules and requirements—, 
will make the country a member of the European 
energy market. This, in turn, will be a major step to-
wards Ukraine’s integration into Europe.
Global goal in a local way
“A useful pocket project” is probably an apt name 
for the European Energy Community: an idealistic 
project of the European Union that is supposed to 
turn the Balkans into a single energy market that 
will be joined not only by the European Union, but 
all the countries on the Balkan peninsula.
The EU’s main goal is to establish a single European 
energy market. Officials in Brussels have dreamt 
for decades about securing energy deliveries to the 
EU from third countries by diversifying sources and 
working to one day have a single EU external policy 
in energy. At the moment, every EU country estab-
Highlights
Ukraine can become a member of the Energy Community, whose goal is to establish a single regional energy market. Membership means real integration 
into the EU energy market
Once Ukraine becomes a member of the Energy Community, its principal energy players will undergo major changes, as the country will be required to 
reform its energy market
Joining the Community will resolve two important matters for Ukraine: stimulating the launch of overdue reforms of the energy market and bringing 
Ukraine closer to the EU
The EU is not oﬀ ering Ukraine direct ﬁ nancial support for the implementation of its Energy Community Treaty commitments. It may, however, provide 
other types of assistance – for example, budget support for energy sector reform
October 2009
European
Focus
European Focus, October 2009
Shaping a European Vision for Ukraine
lishes its own relationships with the external, non-
EU world. Brussels will be able to achieve this when, 
instead of speaking with the voices of 27 individual 
countries, the EU will be able to speak with a single 
voice on the international arena. For this to happen, 
the Union needs to unify policy in the energy sec-
tor, which means unifying the energy markets of all 
these countries.
Still, Brussels understands that immediately unit-
ing more than two dozen countries whose domestic 
energy markets are not very similar is a tall order. 
It will be much faster and easier to do the opposite: 
to establish a number of regional energy markets 
and then to combine those into one large one. This 
is why the EU is counting on regional integration 
projects.
In the spring of 2006, the EU even set up two re-
gional initiatives: the Electricity Regional Initiative 
or ERI and the Gas Regional Initiative or GRI. These 
are intended to be the bridges, the transition stage 
between disparate national energy markets and a 
consolidated cross-European one.
This objective is to be served by the setting up of the 
European Energy Community as well, which was 
launched in 2002 under the Athens process.
The foundation of the EnCT is based on the example 
of an organization that emerged half a century earlier: 
the European Coal and Steel Community, which, at 
the time, was the real beginning of the history of a 
consolidated Europe. The hopes that are being placed 
today with the EnCT are also more-or-less the same.
A brief history of the EnCT
The EU began work to form the EnCT through the European Commission and individual Balkan countries in March 2002. 
At that time, they laid down the beginning of the Athens process, and agreed to set up a South East Europe Regional 
Energy Market, or SEE REM. In November 2002, the Commission, six countries in the region and Kosovo signed a Memo-
randum of Understanding in the power sector. In December 2003, a second MoU was signed regarding the natural gas 
sector.
In signing these two documents, the Balkan countries promised that they would reform their energy sectors as soon as 
possible and open their markets to third countries by 2015.
As these promises had no legally binding power, on November 25, 2005, an Agreement to Establish an Energy Commu-
nity was put together. This time, it was binding, coming into force on July 1, 2006—after all the participating countries 
had ratified it.
The initiators of the EnCT hope to set up domestic 
energy markets in the Balkan countries that will be 
similar to one another. The idea is to then combine 
them into a single regional market and, finally, to 
combine all the European regional energy markets in 
such a way that they become a single large market.
Fortunately, the Balkans are surprisingly pliable 
material. The countries in this region are not deep-
ly penetrated by natural gas networks. This means 
that, if Brussels can help them establish a single 
energy market today, tomorrow it will be able to 
influence the plans of Balkan countries regarding 
the construction of new gas and oil pipelines and 
underground gas reservoirs, and their relations with 
third-country suppliers, whether that is the Caspian 
Basin, Russia or whoever. In this way, the EU will be 
able to kill several birds with one stone: to establish 
“its own” transit region, with underground gas cis-
terns, to diversify its suppliers, and to diversify the 
countries that its fuel transits through. Expanding 
cross-border trade in energy would increase diver-
sification. One result of that, in turn, will be greater 
delivery security.
On the other hand, for countries that are participat-
ing in this project on the Balkan Peninsula, benefits 
from membership in the EnCT do not differ at all 
from those from membership in the EU itself. Guid-
ed by the easy hand of Brussels, the Balkans plan 
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to build a single energy market by first launching 
serious reforms on their domestic markets in order 
to bring them to a Common Market Design. The en-
ergy sector in each of the Balkan countries has to 
become competitive, and instead of the traditional 
vertically-integrated structure, they are supposed 
to demonstrate that their markets have a large num-
ber of distinct players on the market who are inde-
pendent of each other. This will make it easier to 
make the power systems of each country in the re-
gion more energy-efficient. Still, the Balkan energy 
markets will all also have the same legislation and 
a similar regulatory base. This means that they will 
be able to trade power and gas across each other’s 
borders without restriction.
In addition, this will make it possible to solve the 
problem of insufficient power at peak times and the 
cost of resources in the Balkans. Thus, by integrat-
ing the electrical networks in Southeastern Europe, 
operating costs in this sector will likely go down 
11%. 
The Balkans are expected to finish setting up a single 
regional power market by 2015. While the Balkans 
adapt to EU legislation at varying speeds, Brussels 
is looking to expand the circle of participants in its 
energy project, having added Ukraine and Norway 
to the list. These two are currently EnCT observers, 
along with Turkey, Moldova and Georgia.
Leaders and laggards in the formation of a single energy market
By 2015, the residential electricity market is supposed to be liberalized while industrial users were supposed to begin 
to live by the new rules already in 2008. True, these countries are not really managing to do this within the timeframes 
established.
In the Balkans, the European Union’s most determined partner in terms of building a single energy market is actually 
Albania. This country has already properly adopted nearly all the necessary legislation, fulfilled all the requirements of 
the EU, expanded the functions and responsibilities of its regulators, and so on. Other countries that are getting top 
marks on the single energy market are Croatia and Kosovo. Today, Croatia and Kosovo are also almost ready to link up 
their power grids.
By contrast, Serbia and Montenegro have barely managed to adopt the necessary documents while Bosnia&Herzegovina 
is simply marking time altogether. Still, the worst results are in reforming their gas sectors. The main element retarding 
their progress is their political climate, much like Ukraine.
Why does Ukraine need the EnCT?
After the regional energy market is set up, its 
members—the Balkans, the EU and (if it wants) 
Ukraine—will develop a consolidated foreign trade 
and foreign policy position on the issue of resource 
trading. Moreover, the EnCT will give its members 
yet another, extremely significant guarantee. The 
agreement will guarantee that if one of the members 
finds its supply of electricity or gas suspended, all 
the other members of the Community will react as 
one to the threat. Indeed, if the Energy Community 
does provide such a commitment, it will be a first, 
as the EU itself can not today offer any such guar-
antees. 
In other words, joining this organization will help 
Ukraine open the door to the world of new energy 
relations with its foreign partners. And this isn’t all. 
Never mind that this will become a major push for 
overdue reforms in Ukraine’s own energy sector, 
without which the country’s economy will contin-
ue to lose its competitive edge on the world arena. 
Like all the other countries in the Energy Commu-
nity, having joined, Kyiv will begin its path to inte-
gration in the European energy market, with all the 
potential benefits of membership that were listed 
earlier.
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Ukraine is ready to start integration now. In Decem-
ber 2008, the Secretariat of the Energy Communi-
ty held its first talks with Kyiv regarding Ukraine, 
which already had observer status in the EnCT, be-
ing given full membership in the organization. So 
far, Kyiv and Brussels have held several rounds. The 
last round ended 8 October and now the two sides 
are ready to sign a memorandum on joining the 
EnCT. Ukrainian officials expect this to be done in 
December of this year.
The laws of attraction
The state that Ukraine’s energy sector is in today 
would not permit the country to integrate into the 
EU energy sector. This means that, before joining, 
Kyiv has to bring its domestic power and gas sectors 
up to the same common denominator as the coun-
tries in the Balkan region.
The main features of this denominator will be de-
fined in the agreement that Ukraine plans to sign 
with the European Energy Community. Its basis will 
be two basic documents: EU Directives 2003/54 and 
2003/55 on reforming the electricity and natural gas 
sectors. 
Of course, these Directives are not the crowning 
glory but merely the start of the legislative work this 
country needs to undertake. To be more precise, 
Legislation Ukraine must pass to integrate into the EnCT’s single energy market (and the EU)
1. EU Directives* 2003/54 and 2003/55, regarding the regulation of the power and gas sectors.
Planned implementation deadline:* 1.01.2012
2. Drafting and adopting legislation* that establishes specific changes on the gas and power markets and the overall 
concept called for in the designated Directives
Planned implementation deadline:* 1.01.2012
3. Acquis communautaire: 
in environmental protection (EEC Directive 85/337 on assessing the impact on the natural environment; EU Di-
rective 1999/80, regarding a reduction in the sulfur content of fuels; EU Directive 2001/80 regarding large-scale 
waste-burning production facilities)
in renewable energy (Directive on promoting renewable sources of energy and using biofuels)
in electricity (Directive on liberalizing power markets and regulating cross-border trade in electricity)
in oil and gas**
4. Parallel legislation.*
Ukraine must: 
join the ENTSO-E
establish a deep Free Trade Area with the EU (in the context of an Agreement on Association between Ukraine 
and the EU)
bring competition legislation in line with EU standards
Planned implementation deadline:* 1.01.2012
* Priority areas of legislative change.
** The EU Directives for this sector have not yet been drafted, although Kyiv and EnCT leadership have already agreed that in the future, Ukraine’s 
reform will, in fact, tackle this area.
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they only show the direction in which Ukraine has 
to travel. Drafting, planning and executing changes 
to Ukraine’s legislation will have to be done inde-
pendently and personally. Moreover, it will have to 
be done within a very concrete and ambitious time-
frame. Ukraine has to adopt and enact new legisla-
tion and, most importantly, force the market to start 
making money based on the new scheme by 1 Janu-
ary 2012, according to prior agreements that are 
currently in effect. In turn, reforms to the domestic 
energy market will be a kind of “pre-operative ther-
apy” that will make it possible to prepare Ukraine’s 
power sector for the operation called “integration 
into the European energy market.”
Incidentally, at the same time as it changes its own 
energy market internally, Ukraine is supposed to 
bind itself to a slew of external commitments. In 
addition to signing an agreement with the EnCT, 
Kyiv and Brussels will undertake a slew of satellite 
processes. In the power sector, we promise to join 
the Union for the European Network of Transmis-
sion System Operators for Electricity (ENTSO-E), 
which will handle the technical issue of exporting 
electricity from Ukraine to the EU. In the gas sector, 
we have undertaken a dialog with the EU regarding 
the modernization of Ukraine gas transit system. Fi-
nally, in the context of talks with the EU regarding 
a deep Free Trade Area, Kyiv is formulating a con-
tractual basis for trading in electricity.
A way to resolve key problems
One of the key changes in the energy market will 
be the result of Directive 2003/54. As the main dif-
ference between the electricity market of the future 
and the market as it is today, Directive 2003/54 in-
troduces an interesting term called “unbundling,” 
which it applies to the process when monolithic in-
dustrial groups decide to voluntarily disaggregate 
themselves and to turn into more compact, mobile, 
independent entities.
To translate this into the language of Ukraine’s 
power industry, the Directive calls for those areas of 
its operations where competition is physically im-
possible to be separated from those that can thrive 
on it. In short, the transmission and delivery of elec-
tricity should be separated from its generation and 
sale. Separate, functionally independent enterprises 
should take on these various functions.
In other words, the players on Ukraine’s market to-
day are looking at major changes in their lives. To-
day, a slew of oblenergos, for instance, function as 
both the seller and the distributor of power that is 
generated. After these reforms, the shareholders of 
all these oblenergos will be forced to think of how 
to reorganize their companies so that their activities 
are separated yet they don’t find themselves in con-
flict over deciding on top management over each of 
the areas of operation.
At the same time, the Directive requires Ukraine 
to encourage the emergence of many new, smaller 
players on the market. And they, so the EnCT hopes, 
will have freer access to the network—at a separate 
price, of course.
Even greater “innovations” await the wholesale mar-
ket for electricity. Today, this market contains a sin-
gle buyer, the universal middleman between genera-
tors and oblenergos—the owners of the power trans-
mission lines. This is Energorynok, a state company. 
It is Energorynok (literally, Power Market) that buys 
power formally from the generators and sells it on to 
the distributors. And at the same time, it guarantees 
that, when it comes to setting rates, the generators 
will be protected from the abuse of the oblenergos. 
Despite all these advantages, however, this system 
does not permit Ukraine to build alternative energy 
sources, as it prevents the buyer from deciding for 
itself, from which generator it wants to buy: the one 
that pollutes the air by generating with the use of 
coal, or the one that has modern mechanisms for en-
vironmentally-friendly generation of power.
If Kyiv decides to join the EnCT and, eventually, 
the European energy market, it will have to aban-
don this structure and allow power-generating 
companies (sellers) and distributors (users) to trade 
directly.
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Making the illusory real
The changes awaiting Ukraine in the gas sector are 
no less radical. Today, this sector is an equation with 
many unknowns and the objective of reform accord-
ing to Directive 2003/55 on the gas sector will not 
so much change the actual formula by which the 
market operates, but will clearly set things down on 
paper.
Currently, the natural gas market in Ukraine is 
simply not being regulated properly. For instance, 
there is legislation regarding the pipeline transport 
system and regarding the extraction of oil and gas. 
But trading in gas is not regulated anywhere. There 
is also no responsible regulator for this sector. And 
even if it were, it could not seriously affect the gas 
market, given how opaque it is, especially when it 
comes to the status of its major players.
In other words, Ukraine will not so much have to 
reform the gas sector as place it within a civilized 
legal framework and strengthen regulation. Only 
then will the question of ownership of networks be 
clearly regulated in Ukraine. Then its market will 
eventually have several —and possibly even several 
dozen—independent traders who will have open ac-
cess to this network under law. Finally, a specially-
created regulator will have to establish the rules of 
behavior for this market. One option would be to 
transfer these functions to NERC.
True, this is just a general approach, as we under-
scored earlier, whose actual directions will perme-
ate Ukraine’s power industry only after Kyiv signs 
its agreement with the EnCT. And just how, taking 
what steps Ukraine will achieve the necessary goal 
will depend entirely on the country itself.
The price of independence
A powerful independent regulator is probably one of the main requirements of the authors of the EnCT as far as the re-
form of the energy systems of its individual members is concerned. And this independence will be ensured by the very 
way that the regulator’s work is organized. Its employees should not hold posts in any other organization whatsoever. 
Moreover, neither they nor the actual regulator should be financially tied to anyone, including, preferably, the country’s 
leadership, in order to prevent the risk of political games around it.
Thus, in the context of reforming its energy sector, there could be a proposition that Ukraine not only establish a regula-
tor for the gas sector (the NERC operates on the power market currently), but also guarantee that both regulators are 
completely fiscally independent. They could both work based not on Budget funding but on revenues that they collect 
for issuing licenses and from a general tax charged against the incomes of licensees from their energy-based opera-
tions.
Lobbying is unacceptable
At the moment, Ukraine’s lawmakers are astonish-
ingly passive, when it comes to the power sector. 
Their vision of the future look of the power market 
in Ukraine they have only passed along to NERC. 
Yet this vision is far from what Ukraine’s power mar-
ket should look like, based on the EU concept. For 
example, instead of dismantling a wholesale power 
market with a single electricity buyer in Ukraine, the 
NERC project proposes to simply switch the market 
to an exchange of two-way contracts.
Yet, there is little surprising in this. Reforms threaten 
the interests of nearly all players in the power sector 
in Ukraine. So, it is hardly likely that those whose 
wings will be clipped the most as a result of reforms, 
the oblenergos and Energorynok, will welcome re-
forms with open arms.
The same problems face the gas sector. Several 
draft Bills “On the basis for the natural gas market 
to function” have been hopelessly languishing for 
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years on the shelves of the Verkhovna Rada. The last 
one was submitted to the Rada by the Government 
in October 2009. Deputies lack the courage to pass 
it. The government must take the lead to push the 
laws be adopted.
On the one hand, transparent rules for operating on 
the markets could make the work of some of its play-
ers, such as the oblgases, much easier. On the other, 
no one really knows the entire system of “arrange-
ments” on which the sale of gas works today in this 
country. We can safely assume that there are people 
who will lose commercially from the establishment 
of transparent rules of the game on this market. 
That means that those who try to vote to adopt this 
bill could find themselves facing opposition among 
those who are “not interested.”
However, these are not the only issues over which 
there were differences between the European Union 
and the Ukrainian side. In addition to the two di-
rectives, as we noted, Ukraine will have to institute 
other EU Directives related to commitments in the 
future FTA agreement and the agreement on acces-
sion to the ENTSO-E.
Needless to say, these changes could face serious 
opposition from any number of interest groups in 
Ukraine. Their interests are understandable, of 
course. After all, it’s hard to criticize someone who 
is being asked to voluntarily give up some of his in-
come and influence.
Even in the EU itself, this problem has long been a 
monkey wrench in any general European energy 
security strategy. European companies are also not 
willing to weaken their positions. Still and all, we’d 
like to think that Ukraine has enough decisiveness 
to go ahead and take this step, as the price to be paid 
for remaining unreformed will be far higher than the 
dividends that certain interest groups gain today.
First reform, second money
In talking about any kind of reform, it’s important 
to remember not only that it is useful and urgent. 
It’s equally important to talk about what this reform 
will cost the country and its people. In the case of 
Ukraine, where every step taken by politicians is 
measured by the number of votes they will get in the 
next election, this issue needs to be raised on an in-
dividual basis.
And there is plenty to talk about. In Ukraine, peo-
ple are still not clear what it will cost to reform our 
power sector. And moreover, they have no clear idea 
where to find the money for this.
According to EnCT initiators, modernizing power 
generation needs to be done without state assistance, 
using private money. Of course, they understand 
that investors come in order to establish new capaci-
ties and modernize existing ones, and they have to 
be persuaded that, in the end, they will make their 
profits. This means that, at least with their Balkan 
counterparts, the European Commission has been 
urging the institution of a special mechanism for 
incentivizing interest—by signing Power Purchase 
Agreements (PPAs) with future buyers in advance. 
This kind of contract, the EU believes, can affirm for 
the potential investor that there will be demand for 
the power that he supplies.
Other sources of funding for reforms could be the 
privatization of any number of state enterprises. 
Europe’s corruption fighters are convinced that 
this step could not only help fill Ukraine’s coffers 
but will resolve any number of long-term prob-
lems: overstaffing, debts, and theft of electricity. Of 
course, the decision to privatize or not to privatize is 
entirely Kyiv’s.
Still, our European colleagues understand quite 
well that, none of this can happen without a ma-
jor injection of public money. For instance, it 
will be very hard to attract private investment to 
build power transmission lines and transmit power 
across borders. The amount of investment needed 
in the Balkans in this sphere, as an example, is es-
timated at EUR 340mn. This is why such projects 
either have to be financed from the public purse 
or from donor organizations. Of course, in Ukraine 
spare Budget funds for reforms will, as usual, not 
be available.
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So far, Ukraine’s European partners are not talking 
about financing within the official talks on joining 
the Community. Still, the question of providing as-
sistance is actively being discussed in the context of 
other Ukraine-EU negotiations.
In addition, Ukraine has already received one contri-
bution. The European Commission offered Budget 
support to carry out the “Support for instituting an 
Energy Strategy in Ukraine” worth EUR 23mn (al-
together, the support adds up to EUR 82mn). True, 
the question remains open whether Ukrainians will 
use these funds and, if not, whom to hold responsi-
ble for that on the Ukrainian side. Now Kyiv is hold-
ing talks about having Ukraine’s European partners 
find financial resources for the modernization of the 
country’s gas transport system (GTS), too. It has also 
already gotten agreement, with the intercession of 
the European Commission, that assistance money 
will be forthcoming for Naftogaz Ukrainy.
In other words, Ukraine is unlikely to be abandoned to 
its fate in the matter of funding reforms. It can expect 
assistance in the form of cash, advice and technical 
resources. After all, Brussels needs Ukraine’s energy 
to be secure at least as much as its own. However, this 
realization should not be seen as “free meal” ticket 
for Ukraine. To get this assistance Kyiv will have to 
do some major, demanding and not always popular 
homework on the domestic market. No one can re-
solve Ukraine’s problems without the country’s par-
ticipation. So, standing on one spot and waiting for 
outside help will get us absolutely nowhere when it 
comes to EU integration. Time to take that first step!
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